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CONCERN LEVEL ASSESSMENT: BUILDING 
DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE INTO A VISUAL SYSTEM 
TO SUPPORT NETWORK SECURITY SITUATION 
AWARENESS 
5 April 2013 
Abstract 
Information officers and network administrators require tools to help them achieve situation 
awareness about potential network threats. We describe a response to mini-challenge 1 of the 2012 
IEEE VAST challenge in which we developed a visual analytic solution to a network security 
situation awareness problem. To support conceptual design, we conducted a series of knowledge 
elicitation sessions with domain experts. These provided an understanding of the information they 
needed to make situation awareness judgements as well as a characterisation of those judgements in 
the form of production rules which define a parameter we called the ‘Concern Level Assessment’ 
(CLA). The CLA was used to provide heuristic guidance within a visual analytic system called M-
SIEVE. An analysis of VAST challenge assessment sessions using M-SIEVE provides some 
evidence that intelligent heuristics like this can provide useful guidance without unduly dominating 
interaction and understanding.   
Introduction 
As computer networks grow, so do the demands for managing them effectively.  
Information Officers and Network Administrators need tools that can help them achieve situation 
awareness about states and events within large networks quickly and accurately in order that they 
might diagnose and respond in a timely manner. The 2012 IEEE Visual Analytics Science and 
Technology (VAST) competition issued a challenge of creating a visualisation to support situation 
awareness of the health of a large computer network run by a fictitious corporation called Bank of 
Money. Participants had to use their visualisation to generate an assessment of issues within the 
network 1. With the challenge came a synthetic dataset of parameter reports from nearly a million 
machines sampled four times an hour over a period of 48 hours. Embedded within this data were a 
number of ‘ground-truths’ that contestants might find.   
In this paper we describe the approach taken by a team at Middlesex University in London 
to the development of an entry for mini-challenge 1 of VAST2012. The system is called M-SIEVE 
(Middlesex Spatial Interactive Visualisation Environment). The approach taken to the design of M-
SIEVE was influenced by the idea that the creation of new technology to support expert decision-
making must in some way embody the concepts, principles, and procedures of the work domain 2.  
We also paid particular attention to understanding how experts might use the data parameters to 
draw conclusions about the network. We recruited a small group of cyber security experts and 
conducted a series of knowledge elicitation sessions. Our approach drew more from techniques 
common to knowledge engineering and the development of intelligent systems than techniques 
more typical of interaction design.  
  
The knowledge elicitation sessions influenced the design by demonstrating that important 
distinctions can arise from apparently subtle differences in parameter combinations, which 
parameters were important to the experts, and also by suggesting a number of additional parameters 
that could be derived from the data. One of these was an inferred parameter called the Concern 
Level Assessment (CLA) which represents possible interpretations of network conditions. This was 
implemented within the final system with the aim of providing heuristic guidance to the user by 
‘flagging up’ potential areas of concern.   
 In this paper we focus on the knowledge elicitation process and how this influenced our 
design, including the characterisation and implementation of the CLA. We also report an analysis 
of our VAST assessment sessions using M-SIEVE which provides some evidence for how the CLA 
and its implementation supported situation awareness without overly dominating expert judgements 
through visual interaction with the raw data. 
In the next section we provide some research background, followed by a more detailed 
description of the VAST 2012 challenge. We then describe the knowledge elicitation sessions and 
their outcomes, followed by a description of the M-SIEVE system. We then report an analysis of 
the VAST assessment sessions we ran using M-SIEVE. This provides some insights into the 
possible benefits of using inferred parameters such as the CLA within visual analytic systems.  
  
Background 
In this section we look at three areas: the nature of situation awareness and abductive 
reasoning, intrusion detection systems, and conceptual design approaches as applied to 
visualisation systems.  
Situation Awareness and Abductive Reasoning 
Endsley defines situation awareness as, “The perception of the elements in the environment 
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their 
status in the near future” 3.  As such, situation awareness is considered to progress according to 
three stages or levels: level 1 involves the perception and recognition of relevant cues in an 
environment; level 2 involves the synthesis of disjointed elements into an interpretation; and level 3 
involves near-term projection to predict future states.   
The process of achieving situation awareness is similar in a many ways to the process of 
sensemaking as presented by Klein et al.’s Data/Frame model of sensemaking 4 and achieving 
situation awareness is arguably a kind of sensemaking. Both Endsley and Klein describe processes 
of interpreting a state of affairs through available cues. Both are processes of interpretation in 
which hypotheses are generated to offer plausible explanations for how the cues may have come 
about.  
Implicit within the process of achieving situation awareness and within sensemaking is the 
idea of inference by abduction, or ‘reasoning to the best possible explanation’. Abduction is a 
theory-forming inference in which hypotheses are generated to explain phenomena 5;  as such, it is 
particularly pertinent to any kind of diagnostic reasoning. Just as doctors generate hypotheses about 
conditions from observable symptoms, so cyber security analysts generate hypotheses about 
activity within a network using data derived from the network. The symptoms (or data) provide 
clues (or cues) which give rise to an interpretation. The interpretation then has the role of 
explaining and giving meaning to the symptoms.  
Notably, the logic of abduction depends not only on seeing the cues, but also on recognising 
these as indicative of some state or event of interest. Abductive inference is fallible with its 
outcomes evaluated according to judgments of their plausibility; an abductive explanation can be 
more or less plausible and can be accepted or otherwise on that basis. Where multiple explanations 
are available and are in competition with each other, then it is usual to accept the one that might be 
considered the most plausible. But the interpretation of cues rests heavily on knowledge of a 
domain, different possible states of affairs and their likelihoods, and the causal relationships 
between these and visible cues. Hence, a situation awareness system, human or otherwise, must 
necessarily embody a particular kind of domain knowledge and use it to provide the foundation or 
warrant for drawing inferences from data.   
Intrusion Detection and Visual Analytics 
Intrusion detection systems are software applications or hardware devices that monitor, 
analyse and raise alerts about events within a computer system or network which are indicative of 
attacks or illegal access 6,7.  There are three main categories of intrusion detection system: Host-
based IDSs (HIDSs) which run on each machine in a network, checking stored data, monitoring the 
system state and analysing activities of the machine; Network-based IDs (NIDS) which run on 
dedicated, stand-alone devices in the network monitoring and analysing traffic on a sub-network to 
detect a variety of attacks (including Denial of Service and port scanning attacks); and Network 
Node IDs (NNIDS) which analyse traffic passed from the network to specific hosts.  
Within such systems a number of attack detection techniques may be used, including: 
  
- Anomaly Detection:  Deviations from a baseline of normal usage patterns are flagged as a 
potential intrusion 7. This is quite effective but with the drawback of a high false alarm rate, since 
new and previously unseen activities of a machine might be identified as an anomaly 7.  
- Misuse Detection: Instances in the data set are labelled ‘normal’ or ‘intrusive’ and a 
learning algorithm is trained over the labelled data. Alarms are generated based on specific attack 
signatures. If constantly updated, this technique works very effectively and is less prone to false 
alarms than anomaly detection 6,7. 
- Target Monitoring: A cryptographic algorithm such as crypto checksum searches for 
modifications to specific files. Modifications are reported.   
- Stealth Probes: These use a combination of anomaly and misuse detections to collect and 
correlate data and to try to detect attacks that run over a long period of time. 
Whereas intrusion detection systems place an emphasis on automated inferencing, visual 
analytics tends to emphasize the value of the user exploring and foraging within the data. Fink et. 
al. 8 studied cyber security professionals using a large, high-resolution display and used their 
findings as the basis for a set of principles relating to the design of analytic workspaces and the 
analytic tasks they can support. The system VIAssist9 was developed to provide cyber defenders 
with a better understanding of massive, multi-dimensional datasets in the context of protecting 
critical national infrastructure. VIAssist featured multiple views using a range of visualisation 
techniques to highlight relationships, including maps for geo-relations, parallel coordinate views 
for displaying network connection parameters and bar charts for representing network activity 9. In 
other work, cyber security ‘storm maps’ have been developed which leverage the metaphor of a 
meteorological weather map to quantify the impact of cyber incidences in an efficient way 10.  
Automated detection and visual data exploration represent characteristically different 
approaches to situation awareness support. In the first, automated inferencing is used to analyse 
high volumes of data quickly and in ways which might be hidden from the user. Detecting and 
differentiating problems such as hardware and software failures or network attacks can be made all 
the harder by the size and complexity of large-scale networks in which the number of nodes can be 
counted in the millions. Given that the burden of interpretation is on the system, it needs to know 
what to look for and to find within reasonable performance constraints. In a visual analytic 
approach the burden of interpretation is shifted to the user. Data is made available for visual 
exploration from which the user draws their own conclusions.  This can have the benefit of 
accommodating local values and contextual knowledge, which may be unavailable to an automated 
system, into situation awareness assessments. It would be very unlikely for a system to capture all 
data which might be useful for forming an understanding of a situation, or for a rule set to have all 
the rules necessary to deal with the most local and contextually bound situations.  
Conceptual Design  
When considering the design of a visual analytic system an important place to start is with 
its proposed users and their needs. According to good user-centred design practice, this 
understanding best emerges over time through repeated engagement between developers, users, and 
design artefacts. Iterative user-centred design processes have been proposed which are tailored to 
the problem of designing visualisation systems. For example, Wassink et al. 11 describe a spiral 
process of early envisioning, global specification and detailed specification. During early 
envisioning data is gathered about users, their environments and tasks through questionnaires, 
interviews and observation, resulting in user-profiles and requirements. During global 
specification, low fidelity solutions are presented for feedback, and during detailed specification 
interactive, high fidelity prototypes are developed and evaluated through expert review and user-
testing.      
Roberts 12 proposes a five design sheet approach, with each sheet intended to support part of 
the designer’s journey from requirements gathering to evaluation of the implemented design.  The 
approach has stages and structure through which the designer sketches design ideas and critically 
analyses the solutions with stakeholders. Sketching further allows the designer to consider unusual 
techniques not bounded by technology and iterations.      
These approaches reflect principles of interaction design practice which have come to be 
well-accepted, such as expressing, evaluating and developing conceptual designs early in the design 
process. Conceptual designs may be represented using scenarios, sketches or story-boards 13,14.  
Depending on the medium and supported interactivity, prototypes may be evaluated through 
interviews or focus groups structured around envisioned or simulated user interaction.  
Whilst such approaches have proven history within the design process, they may also have 
limitations. Success depends upon the stakeholders’ ability to conduct mental simulations with 
sufficient depth such that they can make truly informed judgements about the distinction between 
good and bad design; the scenarios may lack coverage of all situations that would be encountered; 
and the feedback obtained may be subject to various biases such as the ‘halo’ effect. Consequently, 
there may be a risk that design decisions are not as well founded as would have been hoped.  
For designing to support situation awareness tasks at least, we explore the idea that 
knowledge elicitation techniques may offer more systematic and reliable ways of answering what is 
a key question for visualisation design: what information about situations to presented at the 
interface?      
Knowledge elicitation techniques have been used for explicating domain specific 
knowledge that underpins human performance 15.  It is beginnings date back to the 1980s as part of 
knowledge engineering work for supporting the development of knowledge-based systems such as 
expert systems, intelligent tutoring systems, adaptive interfaces and intelligent agents 15. Motivated 
by studies by deGroot 16 and Chase and Simon 17, it was felt that differences between experts and 
novices could be accounted for more in terms of memory and recognition of domain-specific 
patterns than any particular strategy or way of thinking 18. Thus knowledge engineering came to 
include the elicitation of domain specific rules and concepts as tools to support constructing models 
of expert knowledge to be used in system design of intelligent systems 15. 
 Knowledge engineering makes use of multiple elicitation methods with each tapping a 
different kind or range of knowledge 19. Methods include 15:  
 observation of task performance or performance of simulated or contrived tasks during 
which domain knowledge and related strategies are surfaced;  
 interviews with differing degrees of structure, including ‘critical incident’ methods in 
which experts are asked to provide detailed accounts of important past events, and 
‘forward scenario simulation’ in which they are walked through contrived events and 
asked to respond; 
  conceptual methods for eliciting the structure of domain-related concepts and relations. 
For example, card-sorting and repertory grid analysis.             
By conceptualising the situation awareness task as one based in the interpretation of cues by 
abductive reasoning, we suggest that there is potential for employing knowledge elicitation 
techniques to inform conceptual designs of visual analytic systems for situation awareness. These 
techniques may address some of the limitations we suggested of traditional interaction design 
methods. By asking experts to systematically articulate responses to a range of parameter scenarios 
it may be possible to produce mental simulations which are more evocative and deep, to cover 
more hypothetical scenarios, and to provide judgements which are more ‘objective’ and less subject 
to bias. 
Although it is not our aim to address these questions directly in this paper, we do describe 
the use of one expert elicitation method in the context of the design of a visual analytic system for 
situation awareness. We do this to explore how it might usefully inform the design of such a system 
and the benefits of such a design for assessments in the context of VAST2012 mini-challenge 1.       
VAST 2012 Mini-Challenge 1  
In this section we provide context by briefly outlining VAST2012 mini-challenge 1.  
According to the challenge brief, Bank of Money operates coast-to-coast over the landmass 
of BankWorld. It has numerous facilities of various sizes (branches, regional headquarters, data 
centres, and national headquarters). It operates a network of 895,025 machines. Each machine has 
an associated class, function, sub-function, lat/long, business unit and facility. 
A dataset is provided containing parameter reports indicative of machine health which have 
been acquired from each machine (those that are switched on) sampled at 15 minute intervals over 
a period of 48 hours (192 time points). At each sample-point, each machine reports its number of 
connections, policy status and activity flag (see Table 1).  
Also included is a map of BankWorld and Bank of Money’s business rules. These are: (1) 
business hours are Monday-Friday 7am-6pm (in each of a number of time zones); (2) staff are 
encouraged to turn off workstations at night; and (3) although Bank of Money engages in planned 
maintenance, it does not occur on a regular schedule. 
Mini Challenge 1 had two parts:   
1. Create a visualisation of the health and policy status of the entire Bank of Money enterprise as 
of 2 pm BMT (BankWorld Mean Time) on February 2nd. What areas of concern do you 
observe? 
2. Use your visualisation tools to look at how the network’s status changes over time. Highlight up 
to five potential anomalies in the network and provide a visualization of each. When did each 
anomaly begin and end? What might be an explanation of each anomaly? 
  
Table 1- Machine Health Table - periodic status reports from all machine equipment in the Bank of Money 
enterprise for a two-day span (15 minute intervals). 
Field Name Description 
ipAddr  IP  Address - ranges from 172.1.1.2 - 172.56.39.254, which is the BoM network 
Healthtime Date/Time - the date and time (BMT) BankWorld time zones 
numConnections Connections - an integer stating the total number of incoming and outgoing connections 
from a piece of equipment. 
policyStatus Policy Status - range between 1 and 5 (severity escalates 1-5): 
1 - Machine is functioning normally and is “healthy” 
2 - Machine is suffering from a moderate policy deviation 
3 - Machine exhibits serious policy deviations and non-critical patches are failing 
4 - Machine has critical policy deviations and many patches are failing 
5 - Machine has a possible virus infection and/or questionable files have been found 
activityFlag Activity Flag - range between 1 and 5 (number represent activity no escalation on 
severity): 
1 - Normal (Only normal activity is detected on the equipment) 
2 - Going down for maintenance (Machine will be off line) 
3 - More than 5 invalid login attempts 
4 - CPU fully consumed (Machine has been detected as functioning at 100% 
capacity during this time period) 
5 - Device has been added (An external device such as a thumb drive or a DVD has 
been detected on the machine) 
Knowledge Elicitation 
We began with some cursory statistical analyses of the data and by generating some 
visualisations showing the geographical distribution of selected parameters. Whilst this provided 
some familiarity with the data it failed to deliver any deep insights about design.  
We conceptualised the design task as one of providing views onto the data that could 
support expert users in inferring useful hypotheses about the network through a process of 
abduction. As outlined above, abduction presupposes domain expertise to mediate such inferences. 
Lacking this within the design team, we were unable to judge whether views were useful. We 
recruited four network-security experts into the design process to help us to understand how the 
data might provide useful insights about issues within the network. They were a cyber security 
practitioner with 12 years experience and three academic researchers with experience in cyber 
security ranging from 10 to 25 years.  
Given the nature of the task and to make full use of the experts’ time we developed a 
knowledge elicitation procedure which was based on ‘forward scenario simulation’ 20–22. During 
forward scenario simulation an expert is presented with a description of a situation and asked to 
draw conclusions and/or discuss their likely response. Additional information is presented by the 
interviewer, but only on demand. Forward Scenario simulation typically results in some if-then 
rules in which the antecedent corresponds to the interviewee’s complete description of the scenario 
and the consequent corresponds to the expert’s response 15.  
The approach of offering information on demand presented some advantages to the design 
process. First, scenarios could be presented that were intentionally impoverished. Resulting 
equivocation in the assessment and information requests could then help reveal just what 
information was required to make a less equivocal judgement (given the constraints of the available 
data). Second, the technique also offered a way of engaging experts in a formative evaluation of 
aspects of conceptual design (that is, what information to present) using mental simulations which 
would be potentially more systematic, more focused, and with greater depth of processing than 
traditional conceptual design review techniques. They would be more systematic by taking a step-
by-step approach to interpretations of the parameter space, more focused by abstracting away from 
commitments to interface design, and would hopefully lead to deeper processing of scenarios on 
the part of the expert since they were asked to actually draw conclusions and/or discuss a response.   
A few days prior to the interviews, we emailed briefing materials to the experts describing 
the challenge. Each initial interview also began with a verbal briefing. We presented the parameter 
combinations on paper as a matrix showing two parameters initially: policy status and activity flag. 
Whilst we could see how policy status might have prima facie implications for situation awareness 
assessment, we were interested in how activity flag might modify these interpretations. The experts 
were asked to systematically review each cell within the matrix and give their view as to what 
might be happening. The interviews were audio recorded and concurrent notes taken.  
Cyber security practitioner interview 1 
Beyond some expected unequivocal assessments (for example, if both policy status and 
activity flag are normal then all is well), the cyber security practitioner indicated some parameter 
combinations for which he would like more data. For example, machine class (e.g. ATM, 
workstation or server) would be a significant additional parameter for assessing five or more 
consecutive login failures (activity flag 3). For a workstation, this number of login failures might 
not be unusual since people frequently forget their passwords. Servers, however, are usually 
accessed by system administrators who have written password lists. In this case password 
‘forgetting’ would be a less plausible explanation and so activity flag 3 might indicate something 
more sinister.  
We also noted how, in describing a range of scenarios, the practitioner adopted a numerical 
scale to communicate his level of concern about different parameter combinations. This scale 
ranged from zero to five, with zero representing no concern and five representing the highest 
concern. He used this numerical scale to articulate his response to different cells in the matrix, 
qualifying each with different interpretations for different machine classes.  
Notably, the rating was not simply a measure of the negative utility associated with each 
parameter combination, but also an assessment of the plausibility/probability of his contingency. 
This scale, which we referred to as the Concern Level Assessment (CLA), was adopted in 
subsequent interviews as a shorthand for discussing the implications of parameter combinations.  
Cyber security practitioner interview 2 
After the first interview, we modified the matrix to include the additional parameter 
(machine class) and incorporated the numerical assessments that had been made by the practitioner 
(see Table 2). We then repeated the procedure with the same expert using this modified matrix, 
giving him an opportunity to review and embellish his earlier assessments. 
During this interview the practitioner reviewed and elaborated on the CLA judgements with 
possible explanations and suggested responses. Further equivocation also indicated that four 
additional parameters needed to be considered. These were: machine function, time of day, number 
of connections and prior reports. Here we give some explanatory examples:  
 Machine function: This acted as a functional decomposition of machine class and 
these sub-classifications could be significant. For example, a machine with a fully 
consumed CPU (activity flag 4) would be more worrying if it were a web, email or 
file server compared to a compute or multiple function server.  
 Time of day: A fully-consumed CPU on a customer-facing teller’s machine or loan 
machine during rush hour might have a more negative effect on business than a 
workstation used in the back office would (the expert made an assumption that 
tellers are used by cashiers, that loan machines are likely to be used by mortgage 
advisors and that office workstations were used by back-office staff.)  
 Number of connections: It would be unusual to take an ATM down for maintenance 
(activity flag 2) when it had been functioning normally (policy status 1) and had a 
high number of connections; and so this would suggest a higher level of concern.   
 Prior reports: The concern that the practitioner associated with some parameter 
combinations depended on prior reports. For example, if a machine with a minor 
policy deviation (policy status 2) was taken down for maintenance (activity flag 2), 
it would be a concern if its policy deviation persisted when it came back on line.  
Cyber security practitioner interview 3 
We restructured the elicitation matrix to include the results of the previous interview (for an 
extract see Table 3). The horizontal axis was expanded to include all possible combinations of 
Table 2 - Using the policy status, activity flag, and machine class to represent concern level. 
 
Policy Status(P) 
 
 
 
Activity Flag(A) 
P1: Machine is functioning 
normally and is "healthy" 
P2: Machine is suffering 
from a moderate policy 
deviation  
P3:  Machine exhibits 
serious policy deviations 
and non-critical patches 
are failing 
A1:  Normal.  Only normal 
activity is detected on the 
equipment.  
0: no concern for any 
machine classes   
1: (needs  temporal 
monitoring for all machine 
classes) 
2: (needs  temporal 
monitoring for all machine 
classes) 
 
A2:  Going down for 
maintenance.  Machine will 
be off line.  
0: no concern for any 
machine classes  
0: (needs temporal 
monitoring for all machine 
classes) 
1: (needs temporal 
monitoring for all machine 
classes) 
A3:  More than 5 invalid 
login attempts.  
1: for workstations 
2: for servers 
3: for ATM 
1: for workstations 
2: for servers 
3: for ATM 
1: for workstations 
3: for servers 
4: for ATM 
machine class and machine function. The vertical axis was expanded to include all possible 
combinations of policy status, activity flag and two derived variables normal/abnormal number of 
connections and office hours/after hours (these derived variables were not provided in the original 
dataset but could be calculated using the data and the business rules). Each cell was then coded 
with the relevant CLA value and associated with plausible explanations for the parameter 
combination and/or a suggested action/response.       
Table 3 – Representing expert domain knowledge via concern level assessment (heuristics).  
This extract shows how the combination of policy status 3 (Machine exhibits serious policy deviations and non-critical patches are 
failing) and activity flag 3 (More than 5 invalid login attempts) is results in different CLA levels when also compared with the 
machine function.  
 
Conditions ATM: ATM Workstation: office Server: email Server: compute 
P3-A3-normal 
connections-
office hours 
2 – but monitor to 
make sure A3 flag 
clear does not persist 
beyond one time-point 
1 – but monitor to make 
sure A3 flag clear does 
not persist beyond one 
time-point 
4 – login failure rare 
for servers 
4 – login failure rare 
for servers 
P3-A3-
abnormal 
connections-
office hours 
3 – but monitor to 
make sure A3 flag 
clear because if it 
persists beyond one 
time-point, a brute 
force attack maybe in 
progress and thus the 
high connections 
2 – but monitor to make 
sure A3 flag clear 
because if it persists 
beyond one time-point, 
a brute force attack 
maybe in progress and 
thus the high 
connections 
5 – possible brute force 
attack 
5 – possible brute force 
attack 
P3-A3-normal 
connections-
after hours 
2 – but monitor to 
make sure A3 flag 
clear does not persist 
beyond one time-point 
2 – but monitor to make 
sure A3 flag clear does 
not persist beyond one 
time-point, machines 
should be switched off 
4 – login failure rare 
for servers 
4 – login failure rare 
for servers 
P3-A3-
abnormal 
connections-
after hours 
4 – but monitor to 
make sure A3 flag 
clear because if it 
persists beyond one 
time-point, a brute 
force attack maybe in 
progress and thus the 
high connections, plus 
this is happening after 
hours 
3 – but monitor to make 
sure A3 flag clear 
because if it persists 
beyond one time-point, 
a brute force attack 
maybe in progress and 
thus the high 
connections, plus this is 
happening after hours 
5 – possible brute force 
attack 
5 – possible brute force 
attack 
Interview with cyber security academics 
After the expert practitioner interviews we conducted an interview with three academics 
who specialised in network security. This interview took the form of a critique of the most up-to-
date version of the matrix, following the same procedure as the original practitioner interviews.  
The academics reviewed the matrix and corroborated its assessments. For example, they 
agreed that concern might be raised where system maintenance had failed to cure a moderate policy 
deviation, and with the need to consider abnormally high numbers of connections and login failures 
differently depending on time of the day.  
Implications of the knowledge elicitation for design  
The knowledge elicitation interviews provided a number of useful outcomes. First, they 
gave an understanding of how different parameter combinations might be interpreted by expert 
network analysts and, by implication, which parameters would be important for reducing 
uncertainty in situation awareness assessments. They showed that such assessments can be complex 
with important distinctions arising from apparently subtle differences in parameter combinations. 
This confirmed one initial design idea that it would be useful to be able to rapidly filter the dataset 
and obtain visual feedback according to complex parameter combinations.   
Second, the interviews indicated variables needed for supporting interpretation, including 
some that would need to be calculated from the raw data. Following the interviews we used the data 
to calculate these, including: norms for the number of connections per machine function for the 
entire dataset; each time zone during office hours; each time zone after office hours, the February 
2nd, 2pm time stamp; changes in policy status, activity flag and number of connections (normal 
and abnormal) over the 192 time stamps; the actual time depending on time zone; whether or not a 
time was in or out of office hours  
We also regarded the CLA as a variable that could be calculated, or rather inferred from the 
raw data and which could be usefully employed in interface design. As an embodiment of a number 
of expert assessments it could perhaps be operationalised as a heuristic for guiding interaction. We 
had no assurances these assessments were complete, or even accurate, but we did consider that they 
could provide useful guidance to an analyst when faced with a large dataset.  
We used the final version of the matrix to define a set of 97 production rules that could be 
used for deriving the CLA (see Table 4 for examples). These rules defined conditions under which 
different concern levels might be triggered. These conditions included specific values for some 
parameters and, where appropriate, left others unspecified. They also included the possibility for an 
additional persistence condition for capturing CLA values for parameter combinations that 
persisted over time. Each rule was also accompanied by a possible explanation/interpretation. 
  
Table 4 - Examples of the 97 CLA heuristics. 
 
Concern 
Level 
assessment 
(n) 
Possible 
explanation 
Current state  Persistence 
Policy Activity Machine Connections Time of day 
0 
 
- - - Normal - 
 
1 
Network Stress - - - Abnormal - 
 
1 
Maintenance - 2 - Normal - 
 
2 
Crash - 2 - Abnormal - 
 
1 
Machine left on - - Teller - After-hours 
 
M-SIEVE 
In this section we briefly describe the M-SIEVE application, paying particular attention to 
how the elicitation interviews influenced its design and how we incorporated the CLA  
The M-SIEVE interface has three parts (see Figure 1). To the left is a geographical view (a) 
indicating the locations of the facilities housing network machines. For each facility, colour is used 
to indicate the highest policy status of its machines, shape is used to indicate site type (branch, data 
centre, etc.), and size indicates the number of machines at the location (on a user definable scale).  
Regions are overlaid on top of this. Given our interview finding that the interpretation of parameter 
combinations can depend on whether a facility is in business hours, this is symbolised for each 
region using a white or black background (black for night, white for day).  
 
To the right of the interface we used an attribute explorer  (b) 23–25. This shows the 
distribution of machines over a vertically arranged set of horizontal histograms, where each 
histogram corresponds to one of the attributes (from top to bottom): policy status, activity flag, 
machine class, machine function and number of connections. Given the size of the dataset we 
visualised these parameters on a logarithmic scale. 
The elicitation interviews also supported the need for rapid filtering by complex parameter 
combinations. Selecting a column on a histogram creates a filter corresponding to the associated 
bin range.  Multiple column selections within a single histogram are combined as an OR query. 
Selections across multiple histograms are combined as an AND query. On selection, the query is 
automatically executed and the histograms are dynamically updated to show the distribution of 
values on the new subset. Using multiple coordinated views 26, updates in the attribute explorer are 
automatically reflected in the map view. Conversely, regions can be selected within the map to 
further subset the data.  
 Figure 1 - The M-SIEVE application; a) the spatial window, b) the attribute explorer, c) timeline control. 
a) Spatial window, Map of BankWorld with overlays indicating machine locations, b) Attribute explore which represents 
each attribute as an interactive histogram, c) Interactive time bar for accessing specific points in time, 1) Play/pause button used to 
automatically play through the dataset, 2) Facilities legend, 3) Colour is used to indicate the maximum policy status of machines at 
each location, and 4) Menu options to open additional functionality, including the CLA and the data drill down viewer. 
 
The interviews also showed how understanding prior states could lead to important differences in 
interpretation. At the bottom of interface is a time-bar (c). Clicking on this moves the current time 
to that point and loads the corresponding status of machines according to the current filter.  A 
play/pause button can also be used to automatically advance through sample points within the 
dataset. The map view and histograms synchronously update at each time point.  
  
Incorporating the CLA 
We regarded the CLA as a variable that could provide useful heuristic guidance to a user. 
However, a significant issue was how to operationalise it in a way that could provide this guidance 
without constraining the expert from drawing their own conclusions. Ideally we would have 
preferred to incorporate the CLA as an additional parameter within the attribute explorer. This way 
it could be incorporated into filters or ignored. However, constraints of the VAST competition 
timeframe led us to implement it within an additional live analysis module with a table 
visualisation. This showed a table of machines currently displayed on the map visualization, subject 
to filtering by the attribute explorer or by selection from the map, ordered by CLA (see rightmost 
column, Figure 2). Using this table the user can easily identify the IP address, policy status, and 
activity flag of the most severe machines (i.e. higher CLA values).   
 
Figure 2 - CLA data explorer, individual level machine information at a single time point shown with the concern 
level. 
 
  
 ,
Figure 3 - Treemap visualisation showing CLA for 2nd of February at 2pm. 
a) CLA distribution for the entire network, b) CLA Medium high (811) distribution across regions/ facilities, c) CLA distribution for 
Regions 10 - headquarters. 
  
Region 10 –  
headquarters 
(52) 
a 
b 
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 The role of the CLA in the VAST Assessment 
We used M-SIEVE to perform an assessment to submit for mini-challenge 1 of the 2012 IEEE 
VAST challenge. This was done in two sessions. The first session was conducted by a group of 
academics with expertise in visualisation. The second session was conducted by the cyber security 
practitioner and one of cyber-security academics who participated in the earlier knowledge 
elicitation exercise. We were particularly interested in understanding the extent to which the CLA 
might contribute to the VAST assessments and also whether it might dominate over exploration of 
the raw data, and so we video recorded the sessions and recorded a think-aloud protocol for 
subsequent qualitative analysis.   
For the assessment we used a three monitor set up (see Figure 4): one showing the main M-SIEVE 
interface (see Figure 1 and Figure 2), one showing the treemap (see Figure 3), and one showing a 
Microsoft Excel worksheet.  The worksheet displayed histograms showing connection frequencies 
across machine function overall, for a single time-point (2pm on 2nd of February) and in different 
time zones and office/ after hours.  The details of problem and accompanying meta-data were 
provided on printed sheets.   
 
Figure 4 - The M-sieve setup for the assessment in the usability lab. 
Analysis 
We first segmented the video data by periods in which the different anomalies that we 
reported were discovered. We then coded each of these periods for the extent to which the 
outcomes could be explained by reference to use of the CLA, visual exploration (of raw data), or 
both. Coding was performed by a single researcher and was determined by the observation of 
onscreen interaction with the CLA or the visualisation, and also where these were discussed during 
any given period. The analysis was interpretive, based on a small sample and no controls were 
used; however, we consider the results indicative and useful.  
Contribution of the CLA 
Results of the qualitative analysis are summarised in tables 5 (mini-challenge 1.1) and 6 
(mini-challenge 1.2). For each anomaly in the data, the tables show whether or not it was 
discovered, and if so, whether this was attributed to use of the CLA, to visual interaction with the 
raw data (Viz), or both. Where items in the ‘discovery’ column are marked with an asterisk the 
anomaly was not intentionally placed in the dataset, but was subsequently acknowledged as 
significant by VAST submission reviewers. Where the ‘discovery’ column is marked with a double 
asterisk the anomaly was not intentionally placed in the dataset and was not subsequently 
acknowledged as a significant by the submission reviewers (but it nevertheless occurred).     
 
Table 5 – Summary of the qualitative analysis of reports for MC1.1  
MC1.1 - Anomaly Discovered CLA Viz 
Discovery of virus infected computer. Yes* Yes Yes 
Various deviations from norm in Region 10 HQ. Yes* Yes Yes 
Several Region 25 machines offline  
(Related to Hurricane storyline) 
No n/a n/a 
Limited machines reporting from Data Center 5 No n/a n/a 
 
Table 6 – Summary of the qualitative analysis of reports for MC1.2 
 
MC1.2 - Anomaly Discovered CLA Viz 
Machines becoming less healthy with connection traffic rising during 
business hours. Trend is reflected in policystatus increase. Yes Yes 
Workstations on afterhours contrary to business rules.  Yes** Yes 
Teller machines used off-hours. The behavior starts in Region 10 and 
spreads. The next night all available machines in the region are involved.   Yes Yes Yes 
The Data Center 5 comes online on February 2nd.   Partially Yes Yes 
Region 5 and 10 identified as particularly unhealthy  Yes* Yes 
Lack of well-performed maintenance Yes* Yes 
Rolling blackout up the eastern sea coast (due to hurricane).  Computers 
in Region 25 go offline from 10am, continuing throughout evening.   No n/a n/a 
 
The summaries show that using M-SIEVE our assessors discovered a total of eight 
significant anomalies - two for MC1.1 and six for MC1.2 (of which one was partially discovered). 
Of these (in total), four were discovered using the CLA and raw data visualisations in combination, 
one was discovered using the CLA alone, and three were discovered using just the raw data 
visualisations.  
Below we describe in detail how the CLA contributed to the discovery of the first two 
anomalies reported for MC1.1 (acknowledged subsequently by reviewers as significant) and some 
related phenomena.  
 At 2pm, 2nd February there was only one machine at CLA 5. This was a machine in 
HQ datacenter-2 in Region 36, which had a virus infection (the anomaly).  However, 
at that time 811 machines were classified as CLA 4.  For some machines this is due 
to a high policy status, while for others it was due to a combination of activity flag 
and/or the number of connections for the machine type.  For example, one Web 
Server had activity flag 4 and a statistically high number of connections for a web 
server.  This can indicate a denial of service attack. 
 At this time, 12,065 of the machines were at CLA 3. For the majority this was due to 
a policy status of 3, and for the remainder this was due to a combination of activity 
level, number of connections and machine type. For example, some servers in the 
Region 10 Headquarters were rated CLA 3 due to the number of login failures.  
These are expected for workstations but not for servers. None of the Region 10 HQ 
machines were rated as CLA 0.  For the majority, the CLA value is 1, but we 
determine that the facility as a whole is a cause for concern. 
We consider these results to be encouraging. They show that the CLA played an active part 
in supporting the assessments that were made as part of our response to the VAST challenge. But 
they also show that whilst the CLA supported assessment and was solely responsible for one 
assessment, it did not do so at the expense of exploration of the raw data. Indeed, three assessments 
were attributed to exploration of the raw data only.     
Discussion & Conclusion 
In this paper we have explored an approach to developing a visual analytic system for 
supporting situation awareness in a network security context. Solutions to this problem, we argue, 
are complicated by the need to support user-exploration and interpretation, whilst dealing with 
problems associated with the amount of data that can be reported concerning activity in large 
networks. Current intrusion detection systems employ automated detection and thus encode 
relevant expert knowledge. A visual analytics solution places more emphasis on user-exploration 
and knowledge, but large amounts of data might make significant signatures and patterns difficult 
to find.  
We propose a hybrid approach. In developing this approach we performed a series of 
elicitation interviews with domain experts. We used a matrix to encode abductive inferences that 
might explain different parameter combinations. We learned that this was a useful technique since 
during interviews it enabled our expert practitioner to focus attention on individual judgements in a 
systematic way, and by forcing the judgement of the practitioner we were able to understand the 
inferences that were made and answer questions about the parameters that were useful. Some 
parameter combinations were ambiguous, particularly for deciding between competing plausible 
explanations where benign explanations competed with the less benign. By mapping out and 
extending the represented parameter space we were able to feel confident that the results of the 
interviews were reasonably accurate and exhaustive. Indeed, the matrix evolved iteratively through 
a series of interviews, which culminated in the satisfaction of the expert practitioner that we had 
successfully captured his insights. 
This exercise resulted in an understanding of how parameter combinations might be 
interpreted and which parameters were important, including some which were calculated from the 
raw data. From the early interviews with the expert practitioner we also derived a way of discussing 
the severity of parameter combinations through a numerical scale that we referred to as the Concern 
Level Assessment or CLA. The CLA was a subjective assessment that aggregated interpretation, 
plausibility and utility. Offered initially by the expert, it became the de facto currency of the 
interviews. Given its origins with the practitioner, we assume, if not an in vivo concept, it is at least 
intuitive.  
For the academic experts the presentation of a rule set perhaps belied the idea that it would 
be incorporated into a hybrid system that would be designed to support free-form exploration of the 
parameters in addition to incorporating an automated alerting system. This is perhaps a question of 
presentation. On using the final system they appreciated to ability to use the complementary 
strategies of exploring the data or using the CLA.   
Through the elicitation process we were able to demonstrate the feasibility of applying a 
knowledge engineering technique as an approach for addressing a problem of visual analytic 
system design in a way that appears systematic and comprehensive. This application seemed 
particularly appropriate given a problem in situation awareness and a need to understand (a) the 
variables needed for supporting interpretation, and (b) how different parameter combinations might 
be interpreted. Together these supported a design which appeared to successfully support human-
in-the-loop analysis of large amounts of data. Overall, the elicitation technique offered an approach 
that:  
 Used an external artefact (matrix) to engage expert users in a series of specific 
parameter judgements; 
 Encouraged expert users to make scenarios more specific through their requests for 
more information; 
 Addressed the parameter space in a systematic way;  
 Developed domain knowledge iteratively by capturing elicited knowledge in an 
artefact and re-presenting this to expert users for audit and refinement;  
Ultimately the CLA was incorporated into M-SIEVE as an addition view using a treemap. 
Some problems remained unresolved following implementation relating to scaling the CLA data in 
ways that balanced usability with accurate interpretation. Moreover, the use of an additional view 
for the CLA left it standing outside of an integrated workflow to some extent. Given the context of 
the competition, limited time meant that we were not able to fully integrate the CLA to the extent 
we would have liked. Given more time we could have added it as an additional overlay on the main 
view and as an additional histogram in the attribute explorer.    
Given the need to monitor very large amounts of data in many analysis scenarios and the 
problems of managing the limited resource that is analyst attention, we see a future in finding ways 
to effectively combine automated detection with dynamic visual interaction. Analysts seeking 
situation awareness need systems that can show them where problems exist whilst giving them the 
freedom to explore data and reach their own conclusions, perhaps based on contextual factors that 
are known only on the ground. In future work we intend to explore this design balance further as a 
potentially promising research direction.  
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